Needs also seem to have a more "objective" character than preferences. Although they are not value-neutral as Willard9 rightly argues, one can tell in a reasonably objective way what they are and how they can be satisfied. Certainly in the case of an unconscious patient whose preferences we cannot determine, one can, on medical grounds, determine rather objectively which basic needs the patient has.
"the necessaries [needs] of life are so few and simple that a man is soon satisfied in regard to these, and desires to extend his range of enjoyment".2 The suggestion here is that the fulfilment of needs, however few and of marginal importance to economic analysis, is a prerequisite to having desires satisfied. In addition, there is the implicit suggestion that needs and wants are distinguishable on account of their nature, with one being indispensable to life, the other not.
Further on in his book, Jevons explained the "law of variation of utility", utility being something measured by and defined as "the addition made to a person's happiness".3 He used the example of the consumption of quantities of food, where the utility of the first increment of food is infinite since the first increment is "indispensable to life".4 The utilities of further increments of food become definable and determinate at a certain point, and diminish with every additional increment. Clearly, Jevons's initial conflation of needs and wants, is unravelled in his explanation of diminishing (marginal) utility. A similar thing happens in Menger's Principles of Economics.5 In this book, Menger, like Jevons, initially suggested that there are "needs of different kinds" that can be satisfied and that each need can be satisfied "more or less [completely] ".6 The terms, needs and wants, are used interchangeably in the text, indicating that Menger did not see a reason to distinguish sharply the two concepts. Nevertheless, throughout his analysis of how goods get value there are allusions to the fact that man has certain basic needs which differ in nature from wants, and that the former are to be analysed separately from the latter.
Modem mainstream economists' charges against the concept of needs include its alleged ambiguity, its indeterminacy and its subjectivity or value-ladenness.7 Putting needs into practice, as opposed to preferences, as part of social policy, is considered to be an arbitrary, paternalistic business, not in line with the economist's espoused professional objectivity. Contemporary economists assert that everything that is done with needs can be done with preferences, using conventional indifference curve analysis. If, indeed, someone feels that he or she needs something desperately, this will show up as a very intense preference. One possible way to show this is to define degrees of intensity of preferences in terms of elasticity of demand. Those goods for which there is inelastic demand are intensely preferred goods. Other goods have more elastic demand and preferences for them will tend to be less intense. But here, as above in the case of the marginalists, we are left with a sense that although the differences are supposedly only ones of degree, at a deeper level they appear to be founded on differences in kind. Perfectly inelastic goods, for instance, would appear to have a different (ontological) character from goods that are elastic. Goods that are perfectly inelastic would seem to fit the description of necessities or needs, whereas elastic goods would appear to fit the label of preferred goods or items desired but not required. 
Basic needs

Infinite regress
One opponent of the concept of needs, Willard, 9 states that needs are not valuable in themselves, but a means to "something else considered to be valuable".'3 To establish a need is to establish a means to something else considered to be valuable. Hence, to say that one needs food is to say that food is needed in order to survive. The problem with this instrumentalist reasoning is that it runs into an inescapable infinite regress. Accepting for the moment that the need for food is not valuable in itself, but only a means to something else, namely, survival, one is left without an explanation for why most living creatures express an apparent need to survive. I believe that it is useful to distinguish in this regard between instrumental needs such as medical care and food, and non-instrumental needs such as 
Deliberate conflation
As was stated above, the QALYs approach measures benefits yielded by medical treatment. The measurement of the quality adjustment factor is based, however, solely on patients' preferences. It appears not to take into account (nor to measure) patients' basic needs. The reason for this seems to stem from a rather deliberate conflation of needs and preferences by health economists. It is assumed by the economist that the health state preferences automatically take needs into account since preferences and needs belong to the same category. As a result, a clear specification of what a need is and what a preference is, is judged unnecessary. Although it is undeniable that preferences can and do take needs into account under many circumstances, it seems improbable that all needs at all times are taken account of in a person's preference structure.
In my view, it would also seem that the relationship between preferences and benefits on the one hand, and needs and benefits on the other, is of a different nature. Conferring benefits through treatment, benefits based on health state preferences, presumably satisfies these preferences. However, the relationship between needs and benefits is substantially different. While fulfilling a need does confer a "potential benefit",30 the reverse proposition is not necessarily the case; conferring a benefit does not necessarily satisfy a need.
Hypothetical example I hope that the following hypothetical example will help to make this clear. Say we are comparing a health programme which saves lives with a programme which improves quality of life. Specifically, let us suppose that we are comparing, in terms of QALYs, the benefits of a kidney dialysis programme to the benefits of a cosmetic surgery programme. Suppose that groups of patients belonging to the two programmes have the same average life expectancy following appropriate treatment. With treatment the average quality adjustment factor for the kidney patients is found to be 03, while the cosmetic surgery patients' average is 07. Without treatment the kidney patients die; death's quality of life adjustment factor is zero. While without treatment, the cosmetic surgery patients have an average quality of life adjustment factor of 04. A calculation of net QALYs reveals that both programmes have equal net QALYs. Now assume that costs are equal for both programmes, which results in equal costsper-QALYs. And assume further that there is only sufficient funding for one of the programmes. Because costs-per-QALY are equal, do we (may we?) conclude that we are indifferent between allocating funds to treat either the cosmetic surgery or the kidney patients?
I suggest that we are not (may not be?) indifferent because we are dealing with two fundamentally different kinds of health care programmes; the first of which involves the basic need to survive, while the second involves preferences distinguishable from the latter basic need. Satisfying the basic needs of the kidney patients is seen here as a necessary condition of survival, while satisfying the preferences of the cosmetic surgery patients is not a similarly necessary condition. Since, in all probability, the medical profession ethos would prescribe the prevention of death as a first priority before satisfying the preferences of patients which are unrelated to survival, it is very likely that funds in this hypothetical case would be allocated to treat the kidney patients.
It seems that in this case we are forced to step back from the deceivingly straightforward QALY calculus and invoke a meta-principle of some kind such as the principle that saving lives is judged more important than improving the quality of life of patients.
I believe that a comparison like this involves two distinct value dimensions that are characterised by category differences in kind. One of the value dimensions concerned relates to a basic need to survive, while the other does not; it relates to preferences. The implication of this sort of judgment is that the scale on which the quality of life adjustment factor is measured may not be represented as a continuous equally spaced interval scale on which there is only one value dimension.
For technical reasons, QALY analysis must assume that the transformed category-rating scale mentioned above conforms to the properties of an interval scale. It has to do this in order to ensure interpersonal comparability of preference values. A scale which exhibits interval scale properties is one on which the values attached by respondents to numerically equidistant intervals on the scale (for example, intervals {0-1, 0} and {0 3, 02}) are equal.3' In other words, the value attached to a move on the scale from 0-1 to 0 is the same as the value attached to a move from 0 3 to 0-2. This is a controversial claim, but an empirically testable one. It would be interesting to discover whether in the context of the hypothetical example above, the interval {03, 0} is perceived of as "equivalent" to the interval {0 7, 0 4}. Is a move from a low quality of life (03) to death given the same weight as a move from a "good" quality of life (0 7) to a lesser quality of life (0-4)? Nord32-34 suggests, on the basis of a number of empirical findings, that in making comparisons similar to the one above, ie, comparing programmes which save lives to programmes which improve quality of life, it is likely that different weights will be attached to the intervals considered. As a result, what appear to be equally spaced intervals, {0-3, 0} and (07, 04}, may turn out to be unequally valued intervals. Nord argues that because QALY analysis measures health states in isolation, it does not adequately take account of moves between health states. Placing this into the context of the hypothetical example above, it can be said that QALY analysis does not adequately assess the value of survival, that is, the severity of moving from 0 3 on the quality of life adjustment factor scale to 0.
Wiggins35 and Lockwood27 argue that the claim a patient has on the health care system should be a function of a patient's health needs as opposed to the amount of benefit (based on preferences in QALY analysis) that the health care system can provide. In other words, it is in order that health needs be satisfied, that we have a positive right to health care. In particular, it is in order that the basic need of being functional (which includes the basic need of survival) be satisfied, that we have a right to health care. I agree with this in principle. Moreover, I think that the satisfaction of the basic need of being functional should be given priority in health policy. However, it should be clear what demarcates being functional from being dysfunctional. The QALY approach of measuring health state preferences will not suffice for the task of finding out where the demarcation point lies. QALY analysis only tells us how people (patients, doctors, nurses, non-patients) judge health states in isolation. Perhaps continuing along the path that Nord34 35 has set out while investigating how people evaluate moves from one health state to another, might assist in finding such a demarcation point. How this might work can be illustrated using the hypothetical example above. If saving the lives of the kidney patients is given more weight than an improvement in quality of life for cosmetic surgery patients -that is, if the interval {0 3, 0} is given more weight than the interval (0.7, 0.4} -then this would indicate that the health state corresponding to the quality of life adjustment factor 0.3, is functional. If, on the other hand, the interval (0.3, 0} is given less weight than the interval {0 7, 0 4}, then this would suggest the health state corresponding to the quality of life adjustment factor 0-3 is dysfunctional.
